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After a fatal police shooting, it is typical for city and police ofﬁcials to view the family of the deceased through the lens of the law.
If the family ﬁles a lawsuit, the city and police department consider it their legal right to defend themselves and to treat the
plaintiffs as adversaries. However, reparations and the concept of “reparative justice” allow authorities to frame police killings in
moral rather than legal terms.When a police ofﬁcer kills a person who was not liable to this outcome, ofﬁcials should offer monetary
reparations, an apology, and other redress measures to the victim’s family. To make this argument, the article presents
a philosophical account of non-liability hailing from self-defense theory that centers on the distinction between reasonableness and
liability. Reparations provide a nonadversarial alternative to civil litigation after a non-liable person has been killed by a police
ofﬁcer. In cases where the ofﬁcer nevertheless acted reasonably, “institutional agent-regret” rather than moral responsibility grounds
the argument for reparations. Throughout the article, it is argued that there are distinct racial wrongs both when police kill a non-
liable black person and when family members of a black victim are treated poorly by ofﬁcials in the civil litigation process.
O n July 19, 2015, Samuel DuBose, an unarmedblack man, was shot and killed at a trafﬁc stop byRay Tensing, a white University of Cincinnati
police ofﬁcer. Tensing was indicted, and the following
January, talks between DuBose’s family and the Univer-
sity of Cincinnati produced an agreement containing the
following provisions: a substantial monetary redress pay-
ment, an ofﬁcial apology from the university president, an
on-campus memorial, tuition-free college for DuBose’s
children, and the establishment of a community advisory
council on police reform with a seat reserved for a member
of DuBose’s family (“University of Cincinnati” 2016).
Contrast this response to one that occurred after tragic
events in another Ohio city less than a year earlier. Tamir
Rice, an African American 12-year-old boy playing with
a toy gun, was shot by Cleveland police on November 22,
2014 and died the next day. A video recording shows
Timothy Loehmann, a white ofﬁcer, opening ﬁre on
Tamir within seconds of arriving at the scene. Tamir’s
14-year-old sister ran to her younger brother’s side, but
was handcuffed and placed in the backseat of the patrol
car; several critical minutes passed before anyone tried to
administer aid. Loehmann escaped without criminal
charges. Prosecutor Timothy McGinty recommended
non-indictment to the grand jury, arguing that the ofﬁcer
did not know that the gun was a toy and had “a reason to
fear for his life” (Williams and Smith 2015). Tamir’s
mother, Samaria Rice, initiated litigation against the city
and the ofﬁcers. A lengthy, highly public civil lawsuit
ensued, with the city of Cleveland’s attorneys mounting
a vigorous defense against all allegations.
Focusing on the United States, this article lays out
a normative argument for the use of reparative justice
measures in responding to fatal police shootings. Taking
the University of Cincinnati’s response to the death of
Samuel DuBose as a starting point, I use the term
“reparative justice measures” to refer to monetary redress
and a range of other material and symbolic forms of
reparations.1 On my account, police and city ofﬁcials
should offer a monetary sum commensurate with the
outcome of a successful wrongful death lawsuit and an
ofﬁcial apology, and initiate talks with the family members
of the deceased about other redress measures they feel are
appropriate. In offering monetary redress, ofﬁcials should
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emphasize that it is not intended as blood money or hush
money, but that the aim is to save the family from the
emotional stress of a civil lawsuit that is their right to
proceed with.2
In what circumstances should authorities offer repar-
ations? Don’t complex matters of fact often complicate the
question as to whether the use of lethal force was warranted?
In the United States the “reasonable ofﬁcer” standard is used
to assess the justiﬁability of the police use of force (Graham
v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386 [1989]; Patrick and Hall 2017).
However, reparative justice need not be beholden to
traditional legal standards—indeed, it should not be. A
norm of reparative justice should apply whenever a police
ofﬁcer kills someone who was not liable to being killed.
Perhaps confusingly, “liability” to being killed is a moral
and philosophical notion, not a legal one. With Jeff
McMahan’s (e.g., 1994, 2005, 2009) work on the ethics
of killing, the concept of liability has gained traction as
a way of assessing the morality of self-defense.3 Self-
defense is not the only reason why police ofﬁcers use
lethal force, but it is the most common reason given, and
recent “Blue Lives Matter” activism has moreover focused
on the dangerousness of police ofﬁcers’ jobs. Indeed,
police ofﬁcers in the United States do have dangerous
jobs. Between 2008 and 2012, an average of 53 ofﬁcers
were killed by civilian attackers annually.4 Zimring (2017,
86) computes what this rate means for American police:
“In a major city police force of 10,000 ofﬁcers, a fatal
assault risk of 7.1 per 100,000 translates into one killing in
an average two-year period.” As such, “the threat of lethal
attack is a palpable part of being a police ofﬁcer in the
United States.”
However, as I argue in the ﬁrst part of the article, that
police ofﬁcers’ jobs are dangerous does not negate the
duties that arise in the aftermath of killing a non-liable
person. I make this argument by subjecting self-defense in
the policing context to philosophical analysis, homing in
on the distinction between liability and reasonableness.
Liability is typically understood as a “fact-relative” matter.
To determine a person’s liability to being killed, we can
ask, taking an objective standpoint, whether she acted in
a way that failed to give the moral rights of others the
weight that is due. Reasonableness, by contrast, is an
“evidence-relative”matter and has to do with the evidence
available to a self-defender that the other person poses
a threat. The distinction between liability and reasonable-
ness is important because in the aftermath of a fatal police
shooting, ofﬁcers often refer to the reasonable ofﬁcer
standard, maintaining that any ofﬁcer at the scene would
have been reasonable in using deadly force. But this does
not mean that, from a fact-relative standpoint, the
shooting was justiﬁed. Moral duties arise when a non-
liable person is killed regardless of whether it was reason-
able to use lethal force. This section also considers the role
of implicit racial bias in police killings.
In the second part of the article, I turn to the idea that
moral considerations, and not just considerations of legal
justiﬁability, matter to the aftermath of police killings.
Reparative justice provides a way for ofﬁcials to act on
those moral considerations. Introducing the notion of
“institutional agent-regret,” I argue that a reparative justice
response is owed even if a police ofﬁcer acted reasonably in
killing a non-liable person. I identify the adversarial
structure of traditional civil litigation as an impediment
to justice for police killings, one that can moreover
perpetuate racial injustice.
In the ﬁnal section, I address two objections. The ﬁrst
is a worry that reparative justice could be instrumental-
ized by cities and police departments seeking to enhance
their legitimacy in superﬁcial ways. The second concern is
that reparative justice unfairly burdens taxpayers.
Self-Defense and Liability in Police-
Civilian Interactions
When police ofﬁcers use deadly force, they often state
that they saw or perceived a gun in the subject’s hand5
and ﬁred their own weapon in self-defense.6 Philosophers
generally agree that an agent is permitted to kill someone
who, with a gun or by other means, is threatening her life
or the life of another.7 By threatening someone’s life, an
agent makes himself liable to defensive harm.
Someone who threatens another person’s life inten-
tionally and voluntarily opens himself up to liability on
this basis. But McMahan (2005) considers permissible
self-defense as extending beyond defensively killing per-
sons culpable in this sense. A person can be liable to
defensive harm and be permissibly killed even if she does
not “deserve” to die. For example, suppose that someone is
driving recklessly, loses control of the vehicle, and is about
to kill a pedestrian (Quong 2012, 64). The pedestrian, let
us presume, can only save his own life by killing the driver
—for example, by throwing a grenade he stumbles on at
that moment (Lazar 2009, 720). Though the driver did
not threaten the pedestrian’s life intentionally or volun-
tarily, she is liable to defensive harm by virtue of recklessly
endangering someone else, and it is permissible for the
pedestrian to save himself by killing the driver.8
Take another case commonly referred to in the
literature (see, e.g., McMahan 2005, 2009; Quong
2012). Suppose that a serial killer is on a rampage in
a small town, and all residents are shown his picture and
told that he will murder anyone on sight. Implausibly,
there exists an unknowingly separated-at-birth identical
twin of the killer who happens to have car trouble in this
same town. The twin approaches the house of one of the
residents, who takes out her gun and is about to pull the
trigger. May a superhero observer who grasps the situation
—and who is too far away to shout to the resident that she
is making a mistake but is within weapon range—kill the
resident to save the twin? Most agree that even though the
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resident is no way culpable, she is nevertheless liable to
being harmed by the superhero. Acting in self-defense is
a risky activity, and if one engages in it, one must know
that there is a possibility of making a mistake (Quong
2012). One can acquire liability in the complete absence of
culpability.
Since McMahan’s initial work on the subject, there is
general agreement that liability to defensive harm is a more
inclusive and ultimately more important concept in
evaluating permissible self-defense than culpability. Dis-
agreement emerges when we ask, “What must a person
who does not deserve to die have done to make it the case
that he would not be wronged by being killed?” (McMa-
han 2005, 387).
This question matters deeply for the policing context.
US law governing the police use of force is based on the
“reasonable ofﬁcer” standard. This standard gives police
ofﬁcers latitude to make subjective judgments, and even
mistakes, about the threat a civilian poses so long as their
doing so meets the criteria for “reasonableness.” From
a moral perspective, depending on the evidence the self-
defender has access to, it is sometimes permissible to use
force while making a reasonable mistake that the other
person poses a threat. Inﬂicting defensive harm on the
basis of a mistake does not wrong this person if she
nevertheless made herself liable. By contrast, it is a serious
thing, a moral wrong, to harm a non-liable person. As we
see in the case of the serial killer’s twin, the reasonableness
of a self-defender’s action and the other person’s liability to
defensive harm do not always align. However, in the
aftermath of a fatal police shooting, a police department’s
focus is typically on whether the ofﬁcer’s actions were
reasonable, not on whether the civilian was or was not
liable. Police departments’ failure to make the distinction
between reasonableness and liability and to give a civilian’s
liability independent consideration has important moral
consequences.
Reasonableness and Liability
In the case of an improbably unknowingly separated-at-
birth identical twin of a serial killer, the resident believed
the twin was about to kill her, but the latter was not
a threat and was not liable to defensive harm. But
consider the following scenario:
Hostage. A person shows up at a mall with a realistic-looking
imitation gun, screams, “I’m going to murder you all!” and pulls
a shopper into a supply closet, blindfolding him and barricading
the door. The police arrive, and the hostage taker issues threat
after threat against the hostage, ofﬁcers, and shoppers, giving the
ofﬁcers good reason to believe that he is highly dangerous. After
several hours of negotiations, the ofﬁcers break through the door
and one kills the hostage taker. As the scene is being cordoned off,
the ofﬁcers see that his only weapon was an imitation gun.9
Despite the obvious difference of the hostage taker
seeming to be doing something wrong, Hostage and the
twin example—from here on out, “Twin”—share common
features. First, relative to the evidence the resident and the
police ofﬁcers have access to, it is permissible to kill the twin
and the hostage taker: inﬂicting defensive harm is reason-
able.10 Second, in neither case does the person perceived as
a threat actually pose a threat, as the hostage taker cannot
kill anyone with an imitation gun. If only these objective
facts mattered, then it would be impermissible for the
resident to kill the twin and for the police ofﬁcer to kill the
hostage taker. Should a person’s liability to defensive harm
depend on the evidence or the facts?
In Twin, the twin is non-liable because he did not put
anyone at risk; he did not do anything that was potentially
hazardous to others. This is a fact-relative matter, but on
the evidence, the resident reasonably thinks the twin is
a killer about to murder her. Supposing that the resident
herself kills the twin (here the superhero has dropped out
of the scenario): she has then committed a reasonable act of
self-defense against a non-liable person. However, a retro-
spective evaluation is all we have to assess the twin’s non-
liability in such a case. An unbiased, hindsight evaluation
on the basis of the facts makes it clear that the twin did not
do anything to make himself liable. Accordingly, whereas
the reasonableness of an act of self-defense should be
assessed on the basis of the available evidence, liability
should be assessed from a fact-relative standpoint.
However, this does not mean that anyone who, from
a fact-relative standpoint, did not put anyone at risk is
non-liable. Quong’s understanding of liability to defensive
harm goes beyond whether a person objectively risks
others’ lives. On Quong’s account, agents may not treat
others as if they “lack certain important rights that all
persons are generally assumed to possess, or else as if those
rights or claims do not have the stringency or moral weight
that they do in fact possess” (2012, 64). From a fact-
relative standpoint, the hostage taker treats the shoppers,
the hostage, and the police as if their claims do not have the
moral weight that is due; he has conﬁgured the evidence to
make it reasonable for the police to shoot him, endanger-
ing the hostage. The hostage taker may not be fully
culpable in the way a person with an actual gun would
be—he may not, in other words, “deserve” to die—but he
is nevertheless liable to being killed.
Let us turn to a case that is quite different from
Hostage:
Trafﬁc Stop. A police ofﬁcer pulls over a motorist at a routine
trafﬁc stop, asking for his license and registration. She is trained
to be alert to situations in which a civilian is drawing a concealed
weapon. As the motorist reaches into his pocket, the ofﬁcer
makes a split-second judgment that this is the gesture of someone
about to draw a gun. Thinking she is acting in self-defense, the
ofﬁcer draws her own weapon and ﬁres, killing the motorist. It is
soon clear that the motorist had been reaching for his wallet.
Trafﬁc Stop is a case of a non-liable person being killed
that is far more extreme thanTwin.Twin is set up precisely
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to show that a self-defender can be reasonable in killing
a non-liable person. In Trafﬁc Stop, relative to the facts, the
driver is clearly non-liable: in reaching for his wallet, he
does nothing to violate others’moral rights or to fail to give
them the weight that is due. However, it is far from clear
that the ofﬁcer is acting reasonably. Though the ofﬁcer
thought the motorist was reaching for a gun, morally, she
is not allowed to defensively kill someone on the basis of
this belief in the absence of sufﬁcient evidence. Belief-
relative permissibility does not entail evidence-relative
permissibility, in other words (Parﬁt 2011, 151–52).
Assaults on police ofﬁcers during trafﬁc stops are extremely
rare (Lichtenberg and Smith 2001), and in such a context,
wallets are a much more common thing for civilians to
reach for than weapons. In the absence of exceptional
countervailing circumstances—for example, police are on
the lookout for a fugitive who has recently shot several
ofﬁcers in the area during trafﬁc stops—the ofﬁcer’s split-
second decision to shoot was not supported by the
evidence she had access to.
But consider a more complicated case:
Imitation Gun. A person is in a public place carrying an imitation
gun. The police arrive on the scene, yelling an order for the
person to drop his weapon. A split-second later, one ofﬁcer ﬁres
lethal gunshots. The object falls to the ground, and as the ofﬁcers
move in, they see that it is an imitation gun.
Is Imitation Gun closer to Trafﬁc Stop, with an
obviously non-liable civilian, or closer to Hostage, where
the civilian is liable in spite of lacking the objective means
to harm anyone? Context matters in assessing liability. In
Japan, a country where gun ownership is rare, a person
might be reasonably assumed to pose a threat to others in
a scenario like Imitation Gun and be culpable for the
decision to display an imitation weapon. However, it is
legal to openly carry weapons in most US states. So, even if
the ofﬁcer thinks the imitation gun is real, she is not
entitled to assume that the person holding it intends to use
it to kill others. As the scenario is written, nothing the
person is doing with the imitation gun suggests his
harboring homicidal intent, nor does he issue threats as
in Hostage. Looking at the scenario from a fact-relative
perspective, he is non-liable.
After a police ofﬁcer kills a civilian, ofﬁcials often
narrowly focus on whether the ofﬁcer’s action was
reasonable, ignoring the matter of whether the civilian
was liable to being defensively killed. But both unreason-
able and reasonable acts of self-defense can involve
mistakes about the defended-against person’s liability.
When an agent makes a mistake, there are distinct moral
duties that arise. Say I reasonably interpret an ambiguous
set of directions in a way that leads me to the wrong rental
property; there I ﬁnd a key under the mat as expected and
enter; or consider a case where everyone’s raincoats look
alike, and I accidentally take another person’s coat
(Ripstein 1999, 200). Once my mistake is realized, I am
not allowed to stay in the rental property; otherwise this is
trespassing. Nor am I allowed to keep someone else’s
raincoat; otherwise this is stealing. Maintaining that my
conduct was reasonable does not mitigate my duties to
make things right. I must leave the property and give back
the raincoat.
In real-world cases where police ofﬁcers kill non-liable
persons, however, mistakes are rarely admitted. That
a police ofﬁcer’s conduct was reasonable is precisely the
defense that is given. This defense typically arises in a very
speciﬁc context, the legal one, but it is not clear why the
existence of a legal arena should negate one’s moral duties
to admit mistakes once they are perceived. A life lost
cannot be restored in a way that is analogous to giving back
someone’s raincoat, but the wrong can be acknowledged
and reparations offered. Conversely, a police shooting
victim’s kin can be wronged not only in a ﬁrst-order sense,
by the loss of their loved one, but also in a second-order
sense, by the authorities’ failure to admit that their loved
one was not liable to being killed and leaving it to the
family to bear the entire burden of the loss.
So far it has been argued that reasonableness and
liability can come apart. Whereas reasonableness is
measured from the standpoint of the evidence to which
a would-be self-defender has access, liability depends on
the objective facts of the matter: from our hindsight
understanding of the situation, did the person who was
killed fail to give the moral rights of others the weight
that was due? Yet making this judgment is complicated
by cases where, objectively speaking, a person imposes
a risk of harm on others, but not necessarily lethal harm.
To give an example, police ofﬁcers sometimes shoot
and kill civilians who are threatening them with a knife or
a blunt object. It seems that objectively, a knife-wielding
civilian does not give sufﬁcient moral weight to the rights
of others. However, just because a person is liable to
harm of some kind does not mean he is liable to being
killed. Necessity is a classic constraint on self-defense. If it
is not necessary to kill someone to avoid serious harm to
oneself, then it is impermissible to kill in self-defense
(Lazar 2012).11 Though a person may be fully culpable—
suppose a knife-wielding civilian tells an ofﬁcer, “I’mgoing
to kill you!”—he is still only liable to the amount of harm
necessary to avert the threat. How much harm is this? The
civilian’s distance from the police ofﬁcer matters, as well as
what he is holding and whether he is stationary, moving
closer, or moving away. If an ofﬁcer aims to stop someone
from walking around with a knife because this is a public
safety risk, and she can do this by removing a bean-bag gun
from her vehicle and ﬁring it, from amoral standpoint, it is
impermissible for her to use more harmful tactics.
Of course, when making a split-second decision, it can
be difﬁcult to tell whether a person is stationary or moving
and how far away he really is. Criminologists Klinger and
Brunson (2009) have found that, in lethal-force situations,
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police ofﬁcers frequently experience stress-related sensory
distortions. Because of these distortions, “the decisions
that ofﬁcers make about ﬁring their weapons will fre-
quently be based on perceptions of the situation that do
not enjoy a one-to-one correspondence with objective
reality” (134). Adrenaline and fear might lead an ofﬁcer to
make a mistake about the nature of the threat a civilian
poses and use lethal force when it is unnecessary. As
Klinger and Brunson argue, members of the public often
misunderstand the experience of police ofﬁcers who use
lethal force, incorrectly using the standard of a calm,
composed person who has no perceptual distortions.
When “police and public judgments about the appropri-
ateness of speciﬁc shooting incidents do not align,” write
Klinger and Brunson (2009, 136), the resulting tensions
“are impediments to sound police-community relations.”
However, what they identify as the public’s ﬂawed in-
terpretation of police reasonableness might instead be
a tendency to conceptualize a fatal police shooting in terms
of the deceased person’s liability to this outcome. If the
public is being asked to expand its understanding of
reasonable lethal force, it seems fair to ask police depart-
ments to also give a civilian’s liability independent
consideration, adopting the standpoint of “objective re-
ality” in doing so.
Liability and Race
So far, moral liability in the police-civilian context has
been examined in the abstract, without considering the
role of race. However, I want to claim that there is
a distinct racial wrong in killing a non-liable black person.
In the United States, the association of blackness with
violence and criminality has a long history (Alexander
2012; Butler 2016, 2017; Davis 2017; Muhammad
2011). It was not uncommon for proponents of slavery
to defend the peculiar institution on the basis that black
people were prone to crime (Kennedy 1997, 11). Amer-
ican law rendered the power of masters to use force as
virtually unlimited, and “slave codes”were used to regulate
black behavior and movement, which any white person,
not just state ofﬁcials, could enforce. In the postbellum
era, the victims of lynching were disproportionately black
males, with an alleged crime—murder, theft, or raping or
sleeping with a white woman—spurring the mob into
action (Wells 1996). When millions of African Americans
left the Jim Crow South for northern urban areas in the
Great Migration, the newcomers faced racism, poverty,
and segregation. The presence in black areas of a white
police force willing to use physical violence was pervasive.
“The Negro’s most important public contact is with the
policemen. He is the personiﬁcation of white authority in
the Negro community,” as Gunnar Myrdal (2017, 535)
wrote. By the 1960s, the practice of lynching had all but
ceased, but racialized excessive force by the police did not.
TheWatts Uprising of 1965 in Los Angeles was prompted
by police brutality; echoes of Watts thundered loudly in
1992 when the Los Angeles police ofﬁcers who beat
Rodney King were acquitted, prompting large-scale civil
unrest (Saul 2010).
“Innocent until proven guilty” is a hallmark of the
American justice system. From Watts to Los Angeles to
Ferguson, throughout the twentieth century, African
Americans have protested the presupposition of black
criminality. Implicit bias research over the last decade
has shown just how embedded this presupposition is. If
shown a picture of a masked robber, individuals in
a simulated juror scenario are more likely to construe
ambiguous evidence as suggesting a guilty verdict if the
robber is black and a not guilty verdict if the robber is
white (Levinson and Young 2009). In a computer simu-
lation directing research subjects to shoot “criminals”
brandishing guns and not to shoot “civilians” holding
non-weapon objects, both ordinary participants and
trained police ofﬁcers were quicker to shoot black people
holding guns and took longer to decide not to shoot those
holding non-weapon objects than when the people in the
photos were white (Correll et al. 2007).12 How does this
laboratory ﬁnding play out in the real world? For
individuals killed by police in a sample studied by Zimring
(2017, 59), black people were more than twice as likely to
be mistakenly perceived as carrying a weapon as white
people (see also Lee 2004; Richardson and Goff 2012).13
In light of the foregoing, my claim is the following.
When a non-liable black person is killed by the police,
recognition of this act as having a distinctive racial
dimension is owed to the victim’s family and community
because of (1) the historical meaning embedded in any
instance of harming or killing a black person based on
a misperception that he or she is a threat, and (2) the racial
biases that present-day individuals are shown to have,
which make it more likely that a black person will be
misperceived as a threat.14 The argument for reparations
that I make in the next section applies to all cases where
non-liable persons are killed by the police, not just non-
liable black persons. However, as I later claim, reparative
justice measures speciﬁcally tied to race are a ﬁtting way of
recognizing distinct racial wrongs.
Toward Reparative Justice
Thus far self-defense scenarios from the policing context
have been evaluated solely with reference to moral
considerations. In the context of academic articles, the
difference between moral standards and legal standards is
fairly clear-cut. There may be overlap between the two,
but one only needs to specify that one is making a moral
but not a legal argument, or vice versa, to avoid confusion
between the legal and moral realms. Real-world practice is
more indeterminate. In the United States, police ofﬁcers
who use lethal force rarely face criminal repercussions
(Butler 2016, esp. 1446–56). According to the standards
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of the law, ofﬁcers may judge themselves to have been
legally permitted, and therefore not wrong, in having used
lethal force. Not only might they insist on their permission
to have used lethal force under the law but also their
lawyers, whose professional duty is to act in their clients’
interest, might warn them against saying anything to the
contrary. To state that their actions were (morally) wrong
is to unnecessarily open themselves up to civil, and
possibly criminal, liability—interpreted as within their
right to try to avoid. To shield themselves from liability,
ofﬁcers must instead maintain that their actions are ones
that any reasonable ofﬁcer at the scene would have taken.
Reparative justice, as I argue, involves a self-conscious
move by government ofﬁcials to employ moral standards
rather than legal standards in the aftermath of a police
killing. Legal standards are the default in such cases, and
their usage incentivizes actions that can generate fresh
moral wrongs on top of the moral wrong of a non-liable
person being killed. When a person not liable to being
killed is fatally shot by a police ofﬁcer, the clock cannot
be turned back; the victim’s life cannot be restored. But
the government can do the best thing under the circum-
stances. It can facilitate full moral accountability to the
family when legal standards are at odds with this.
Graham v. Connor and the Reasonable Ofﬁcer
Standard
When a police ofﬁcer uses excessive or lethal force, it is
typical for administrative, criminal, and civil means of
accountability to be seen as the only available options.
Administrative responses tend to take place within police
departments internally and include verbal reprimands,
desk duty, administrative leave, and dismissal. In most
US states, a criminal procedure begins with a prosecutor
presenting the facts of the case before a grand jury, which
then makes a determination whether the ofﬁcer should
face criminal charges. Civil litigation involves the family
of the victim suing the ofﬁcer, police department, and/or
city. Like civil litigation, reparative justice is compatible
with both an administrative response and charging the
ofﬁcer with a crime.
In civil litigation, there are two outcomes that can lead
to the defendant paying compensation: either the de-
fendant is ordered to do so by the court, or compensation
is agreed on in a settlement. Civil litigation would seem
to be an attractive venue through which justice can be
provided. The facts of a given lethal force case are often in
dispute, and courts can serve as impartial bodies where
a fact-ﬁnding inquiry can take place. Civil procedures are
moreover designed to be fair to both parties.
However, in US civil law, a great deal of latitude is
given to ofﬁcers in their use of force. Let us consider two
examples. First, recall the idea that, for self-defense to be
morally permissible, it must be a necessary means of
averting a lethal threat. However, as a widely read police
manual on self-defense emphasizes, the courts have
determined that police ofﬁcers are not required “to
consider alternative levels of force once the ‘imminent
danger’ element is satisﬁed” (Patrick and Hall 2017, 100).
What does “imminent danger” mean? According to the
manual, it means “simply that the danger could happen at
any moment—it does not have to have happened, or be
happening yet.” Ofﬁcers are trained to identify “danger
signals that are indicative of an imminent attack, such as
non-compliance with orders, presence of a weapon or
unseen hands, to name a few” (100–1). But defensively
killing a person based on signals such as these means that
a police ofﬁcer is almost certainly acting before lethal force
has become necessary.
Second, as per the 1989 Supreme Court case Graham
v. Connor (490 U.S. 386, 396–97), a “reasonable ofﬁcer”
standard governs the police use of deadly force: “The
‘reasonableness’ of a particular use of force must be judged
from the perspective of a reasonable ofﬁcer on the scene,
rather than with the 20/20 vision of hindsight.” This
standard, as the majority justices wrote, “must embody
allowance for the fact that police ofﬁcers are often forced to
make split-second judgments—in circumstances that are
tense, uncertain, and rapidly evolving—about the amount
of force that is necessary in a particular situation.”15 The
allowance given to the judgment of the ofﬁcer on the scene
was a crucial aspect of the ruling. As the Sixth Circuit
opined in Smith v. Freland (954 F.2d 343, 347 [1992])
three years later,
Thus, under Graham, we must avoid substituting our personal
notions of proper police procedures for the instantaneous
decision of the ofﬁcer on the scene. We must never allow the
theoretical, sanitized world of our imagination to replace the
dangerous and complex world that policemen face every day.
What constitutes “reasonable” action may seem quite different to
someone facing a possible assailant than to someone analyzing the
question at leisure.
Hindsight is unequivocally rejected as the standpoint
from which to apply the court’s reasonable ofﬁcer
standard. And yet, as I have argued, it is precisely the
hindsight point of view from which it is possible to
determine that a police ofﬁcer has killed a non-liable
person. Moreover, retrospective reﬂection on the use of
force and an admission that the person killed was not liable
to this fate are owed to the victim’s family. American law
pushes precisely in the opposite direction from moral
claims such as these. But reparative justice provides a way
for government ofﬁcials to deal with the aftermath of fatal
force in moral, rather than legal, terms.
The Concept of Reparative Justice
When a police ofﬁcer kills someone who was not liable to
being killed, my argument is that city and police ofﬁcials
owe the family a reparative justice response, offering the
family the option of obtaining monetary reparations
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(commensurate with amounts awarded in wrongful death
lawsuits), an ofﬁcial apology, and other redress measures
that both sides agree to as fair, without having to ﬁle
a civil lawsuit.16 A reparative justice response is owed
regardless of whether the police ofﬁcer acted reasonably or
not: it is a way of recognizing the wrong of killing a non-
liable person. Here there are important differences be-
tween wrongdoing, or “unjustiﬁable or impermissible
harming,” and wronging, or “action contrary to rights”
(Coleman 2002, 332). Wronging may or may not be
accompanied by wrongdoing. But even if no wrongdoing
was present, killing a non-liable person is nevertheless
contrary to his or her rights. Reparative justice is an
attractive way of acknowledging this.17
Let us delve into the argument for this claim. In
Anglo-American law and beyond, it is a standard idea that
compensation is owed for injuries contrary to rights, that
it is appropriate as a “secondary response to some previous
damage” (O’Neill 1987, 74).18 Welfarist accounts stylize
compensation as literally correcting an injury: no further
claim on the part of the injured party can be made, because
a compensated person should be indifferent between her
current circumstances and the status quo ex ante. In
Nozick’s (1974, 57) formulation, “it compensates person
X for person Y’s action A if X is no worse off receiving it, Y
having done A, than X would have been without receiving
it if Y had not done A.”
Reparative justice builds on the fundamental compen-
satory idea that something of value is owed for a serious
injury, but is concerned precisely with injuries where
compensation cannot make a person no worse off than
she previously was (Vermeule 2012). Further, reparative
justice is relevant in situations where the injurer and
injured parties have a past and a future that go beyond the
wrong. The relationship, and not only the injury, is in
need of repair (Brooks 2004; Walker 2006a, 2006b). In
such situations, it is a problem that compensation “by itself
need not signal responsibility for injury, much less regret
or atonement by those responsible” (Walker 2006b, 385).
By contrast, reparative justice can signal responsibility and
regret. In a reparative justice framework, monetary redress
plays a symbolic rather than compensatory role. It is a way
of publicly recognizing that the life lost was valuable.
If one accepts the general idea of reparative justice, it
easily follows that a reparative justice response is owed
when police kill a non-liable person and the ofﬁcer acted
unreasonably.19 It is a serious moral matter for a state to
kill one of its political subjects. A reparative justice
response shows the family that the city and police de-
partment recognize the gravity of the irreparable injury,
value the life lost, are willing to do what is in their power to
mend a fraught relationship, and acknowledge wrongdo-
ing.
But why should a police department take responsibil-
ity, apologize, and pay reparations if a police ofﬁcer made
a reasonable, evidence-based decision that the non-liable
individual killed posed a lethal threat—a tragic mistake?
To reiterate a previous claim, even if an ofﬁcer acted
reasonably, the non-liability of the person killed itself has
moral signiﬁcance. By deﬁnition, a non-liable person does
not “deserve” to be killed. Reparative justice carves out
space for cities and police departments to recognize the
moral signiﬁcance of what has happened in an area where
the law is unresponsive.
However, this response does not go deep enough in
explaining the rationale for reparative justice under such
circumstances. Let us turn to the notion of what I call
institutional agent-regret. In the interpersonal context,
agent-regret is distinct from moral responsibility and from
regret concerning “states of affairs. . . [which] can be
regretted, in principle, by anyone who knows of them”
(Williams 1981, 27). Someone who feels agent-regret
laments that the regretful state of affairs was brought
about, in whole or in part, by actions stemming from her
agency, even if the injury was nonvoluntary. Williams’s
(1981) famous illustration is the lorry driver who, though
driving cautiously, hits a child who runs into the street.
Agent-regret explains the qualitatively different reaction of
the lorry driver and of someone who reads about the
incident in the newspaper. Moreover, we might say that
a lorry driver who did not feel agent-regret, who tells the
child’s parent, “Say what you will, but I’m no more
morally responsible for what happened than someone
reading about this in tomorrow’s paper,” exhibits a moral
failing. The lorry driver owes it to the parents to
acknowledge that it was his vehicle that hit the child and
to show he regrets the loss.
Assuming that institutions can be reasonably under-
stood as agents (see, for example, Pettit 2007), the
concept of institutional agent-regret seems highly plausi-
ble. In the case of police killings, the city and police
department owe the family members of the person killed
a straightforward admission that their loved one was not
liable to this fate and that he died at the hands of a police
ofﬁcer in a tragic accident. And, just as Williams’s lorry
driver “may act in some way which he hopes will constitute
or at least symbolise some kind of recompense or
restitution, and this will be an expression of his agent-
regret” (1981, 28), the city and police department act
appropriately in offering reparations. Reparative justice is
an appropriate expression of institutional agent-regret—
and the opposite of doggedly maintaining that, as a matter
of law, the ofﬁcer acted reasonably.
All this being said, however, it is probably rare for
a city and police department to bear no responsibility for
the evidence-permissible death of a non-liable person.
Often in such cases, though a tragic mistake was indeed
made, larger structural factors within the police depart-
ment contributed to the likelihood that a non-liable
person would be killed at some point.20 When
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institutional structures and practices play a contributory
role, the city and police department would be wrong to
insist that the death was only an accident and nothing
more. In such a case, the death was at the very least
foreseeable. The city and police department bear moral
responsibility and owe it to the family to admit this.21
Before moving on, a ﬁnal point is worth making.
Liability to being killed is a moral notion. It is only as
good as the moral reasoning ability of the ofﬁcials who
make use of it. Some might be tempted to apply it as
rigidly as they would if it were a legal standard. Again
consider the example of a civilian threatening a police
ofﬁcer with a knife or blunt object. Such a person may be
liable to being defensively harmed, but is only liable to
being defensively killed if lethal force is necessary to avert
the threat. It is possible to envision ofﬁcials splitting hairs
over this distinction as a way to delay or avoid paying
redress while pressuring the family not to undertake
a lawsuit. Ofﬁcials who do this go against the spirit of
reparative justice, which is designed not to be beholden to
rigid legal standards.22
Adversarial Procedure in Civil Litigation and
Settlements
In the previous section, I referred to the shortcomings of
the welfarist model of compensation in explaining the
turn to reparative justice: when a life is lost, money
cannot make a family no worse off than it previously was.
But the civil justice system assigns compensatory damages
for wrongful deaths all the time. Why should police
killings warrant different standards? My response has to
do with the special nature of the relationship between the
government and its political subjects and how the process
of civil litigation can impair this relationship. In the
United States, civil litigation is characterized by adversa-
rial procedure, which can generate new wrongs in the
aftermath of a fatal police shooting. This can take place
even if a litigated case is eventually settled.
What is adversarial procedure? Returning to the case of
Tamir Rice, attorneys for the city of Cleveland answered
the Rice family’s initial complaint with a brief stating that
the 12-year-old boy’s death was caused “by the failure... to
exercise due care to avoid injury” (Heisig 2016; see also
Hooker 2016). This phrase offended Rice’s family and
sparked widespread public outrage. Yet, it probably would
not have been used in any other context but an adversarial
civil lawsuit, in which the defendant strategizes to avoid
liability. A hallmark feature of Anglo-American legal
systems, the adversary method is characterized by the
“respective efforts of the opposing attorneys to maximize
the interests of their side” (Goodpaster 1987, 124). In the
criminal law context, the adversary method is sometimes
lauded for being protective of individual rights. Given the
high stakes of criminal punishment and the loss of liberty
typically entailed by it, a person accused of a crime is
provided the most vigorous defense possible. However, as
David Luban cautions, the individual rights defense of the
adversary method does not apply in the civil context as it
does in the criminal one. Yet the same duty falls on the
lawyer in both contexts: representing the client “zealously
within the bounds of the law” (Luban 2009, 26; here
quoting the American Bar Association Code of Profes-
sional Responsibility).
Civil litigation often features two private parties
opposing each other to determine who should bear the
burden of a harm that occurred. But importantly, the
government and government representatives are not
private parties. Apart from its political subjects’ interests,
a government is not supposed to have interests of its own.
Salus populi suprema lex, as the slogan goes. In cases where
a serious wrong is at stake, it is inappropriate for
a government to proceed strategically against its own
political subjects in the manner of a private party. As
a matter of principle, the government should be willing to
take on the burden of the harm if a non-liable person was
killed by a law enforcement ofﬁcial. In offering repara-
tions, government ofﬁcials honor this idea.
But, one might argue, when a government settles with
the family of a lethal-force victim, it adopts a reparative
justice rather than an adversarial paradigm. Moreover,
perhaps surprisingly, the high-proﬁle deaths at the center
of Black Lives Matter activism have resulted in settle-
ments more often than not.23 The lawsuit ﬁled by Tamir
Rice’s family was eventually settled, and so were lawsuits
concerning the deaths of Michael Brown, Freddie Gray,
Eric Garner, Ramarley Graham, Rekia Boyd,Walter Scott,
Sandra Bland, and Laquan McDonald. It is likely that the
settlements in these cases are not representative: in a sample
studied by Zimring (2017, 132), less than 9% of police
killings resulted in a settlement. However, even in cases
where there is a settlement, a monetary payment is not
sufﬁcient for justice or moral accountability. The process
of civil litigation can undercut the latter, even if a settle-
ment is the eventual outcome.
Consider Laquan McDonald’s case, which is unique
because Chicago police ofﬁcers were caught covering up
key video evidence of the shooting (Schuppe 2017).
Nevertheless, when the teen’s family settled, the settle-
ment agreement contained the following phrase: “The
City of Chicago denies allegations of wrongdoing and
further denies any liability” (Marin and Moseley 2015).
Clauses such as this one are ubiquitous in settlement
agreements. Though there are legal reasons for their
presence, they often speak to municipal ofﬁcials’ self-
understanding that they are not taking responsibility for
the death. This is evident when authorities tell reporters,
“The settlement was not a reﬂection of the Police Depart-
ment’s view of whether the ofﬁcers did right or wrong but
a business decision by insurers” (Kim 2015). Moral
accountability requires the opposite of a no-liability
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disclaimer: directly admitting the wrong and the police
department’s responsibility, and sincerely apologizing.
From a reparative justice perspective, legal principles do
not provide refuge from one’s moral duties. No-liability
clauses should be replaced with apologies.
Moreover, before getting to a settlement, cities
typically spend hundreds of thousands of dollars in
legal fees. The prospect of additional fees in defending
against an appeal is often what pushes a city to settle.
Then, in determining a settlement, lawyers on both
sides strategize to minimize or maximize the payment,
going “back and forth like a poker game,” as one attorney
put it (Kim 2015).24 One advantage of reparative justice
is that the money that would be spent on legal fees
defending the city against the victim’s family goes
directly to the latter.
A ﬁnal issue with settlement agreements is that they
often contain a provision that forbids the plaintiff from
disclosing the contents of the settlement. In some cities, it
is standard for settlement agreements to prevent plaintiffs
from speaking publicly about the events prompting the
lawsuit.25 For the family of the victim, a settlement can feel
like hush money, a monetary payment in exchange for
their silence about wrongdoing. For members of the
public, this can also be frustrating, especially when civil
lawsuits are settled with taxpayer dollars. Foreclosing
information about how much money excessive force is
costing taxpayers, and what one’s fellow citizen experi-
enced that would prompt a ﬁve- or six-ﬁgure payment, also
goes against basic democratic notions about transparency.
Reparative justice rejects secrecy, however. The victim’s
family may choose a private or a public apology based on
their own preferences, but a city may not impose a re-
quirement of conﬁdentiality.
Distinct Racial Wrongs in Adversarial Interaction
In making the case for reparative justice over civil justice
when a non-liable person is killed by a police ofﬁcer, I
have argued that adversarial procedure on the part of the
government can lead to its abnegating responsibility for
a wrongful death, which itself wrongs victims’ families,
and that the practice of settling civil lawsuits falls short of
demonstrating the kind of moral accountability that
reparative justice aims at. Another argument can be added.
Earlier it was claimed that when police kill a non-liable
person, this is a wrong in itself; when police kill a non-
liable black person, there coexists a distinct racial wrong.
Similar claims can bemade with respect to the treatment of
victims’ families. In addition to engaging in adversarial
procedure, sometimes government ofﬁcials treat family
members as adversaries in their interactions with them
and, in doing so, can be insensitive or even cruel. Though
any victim’s family members can be treated in this way,
when the victim is black, again there is a distinct racial
wrong.
Consider the aftermath of the fatal shooting of
Ramarley Graham, a black teenager, by a white New
York City police ofﬁcer, Richard Haste, in 2012. Graham
was shot in his own home; he was followed there by
ofﬁcers who mistakenly thought he had a gun and
perceived the teen as “walking with a purpose.” Graham’s
grandmother, Patricia Hartley, was present when Haste
burst through the locked door, found Graham in the
bathroom, and fatally shot him when he made a move-
ment. When Hartley yelled at the ofﬁcer about why he
shot her grandson, Haste yelled back, “Get the fuck away
before I have to shoot you too” (Walsh 2017). The
hostility of this statement was indicative of the treatment
Graham’s family had in store. The police would not let
Graham’s mother, Constance Malcolm, near the house
when she arrived home fromwork.Without informing her
what happened, they drove her to the precinct station,
where she met her mother and learned from her that her
son was dead.26 Ramarley’s grandmother was then ques-
tioned by ofﬁcers who pressured her to agree with their
claim that Graham had a gun that he had thrown out
a window. (No gun was ever found within or outside the
apartment.) The evening of the day her grandson was
killed, the police detained Hartley for seven-and-a-half
hours (Walsh 2017).27
Haste was subsequently indicted, but a judge threw
out the charges, and a second grand jury chose not to
reindict the ofﬁcer. The family then ﬁled a civil suit. After
some time, news outlets reported that the Internal Affairs
Bureau of the NYPD was refusing to release the ﬁles on
Graham’s death as a delaying tactic. Constance Malcolm
vented her frustration to reporters: “The police are playing
games. They’re stalling, basically that’s what they’re doing,
they’re stalling so the case can’t go forward” (Hoffer 2014).
The teen’s father, Franclot Graham, expressed dissatisfac-
tion that, two-and-a-half years after his son’s death, the
department claimed it was still investigating the shooting.
“We just want our day. We want to be heard, we want to
know the facts of what happened,” he said. He described
a recent visit to his son’s gravesite: “I tell him that we’re
ﬁghting, but we just feel like for some reason, it’s a losing
battle because nobody’s listening to us” (Hoffer 2014).
That black people are disproportionately victimized by
fatal police shootings is borne out by the empirics. But
when black families are poorly treated by the authorities
after losing a loved one to a police shooting, it is not clear
how to quantify the phenomenon of race-based second-
class citizenship. Nevertheless, when police departments
and municipalities engage in adversarial tactics and refuse
to hold their own ofﬁcers accountable, this is likely to be
experienced by the family and community of a black
victim as linked to race. A 2017 New York Times op-ed by
Constance Malcolm explicitly juxtaposes racial injustice in
policing and in the aftermath of police violence, holding
the New York City mayor responsible for both:
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In New York City, crime statistics are lower and the overall
number of reported stop-and-frisks is down. But black and
Latino New Yorkers are still disproportionately stopped, and
multiple Police Department audits show that around 64 percent
of stops go unreported. This harassment continues even though
more than 80 percent of stops don’t result in a summons or
arrest.
At the same time, there is no accountability for police abuses,
which has allowed injustices like my son’s killing to go un-
punished. Mr. de Blasio is either willfully ignoring racial
disparities and Police Department abuses in our communities
or has a shallow understanding of the problem. Either way, the
harm continues.28 (Malcolm 2017)
In a reparative justice paradigm, a deferential, humble
attitude toward the victim’s family is vital. The authorities
should be willing to acknowledge the racial dimensions of
any lethal-force death in which the victim is black; they
should also be conscious of racial dynamics—for example,
if a disproportionately white police force is working in
a predominantly black community—that might contrib-
ute to the family’s experience of racial injustice. Impor-
tantly, ofﬁcials should be willing to work with the family to
come up with accountability measures attentive to these
racial dynamics. Examples include racial bias training
sessions, the establishment of community oversight boards
explicitly focused on race and policing, truth and recon-
ciliation commissions on race and policing in the com-
munity’s past and present, and initiatives to end practices
like stop-and-frisk that disproportionately harm people of
color.
However, accountability measures not explicitly linked
to race may also be an important part of taking racial
wrongs seriously. Constance Malcolm, for instance, took
issue with the fact that the white ofﬁcer who killed her
son had not been ﬁred when the city settled. On the
contrary, he received a signiﬁcant pay increase while on
desk duty. In her op-ed, she expressed her straightforward
demand: “New York City must ﬁre all the ofﬁcers who
engaged in misconduct in my son’s killing, and ensure the
same for ofﬁcers guilty of misconduct in all incidents of
police abuse. These ofﬁcers are not safe for our commu-
nities and need to be off our streets” (Malcolm 2017).
Wanting the ofﬁcers responsible for the death of one’s son
ﬁred is not necessarily speciﬁc to racial injustice. How-
ever, it is possible to understand the NYPD’s decision
to retain Haste and increase his salary as a strong marker
of white privilege. If ﬁring an ofﬁcer who has unreason-
ably killed a non-liable person is not already a depart-
mental policy, authorities conducting a reparative justice
process should take a demand of this nature seriously and
honor it.
Objections
A normative argument has been laid out for municipal-
ities and police departments to take responsibility,
apologize, and pay reparations when ofﬁcers kill persons
not morally liable to this fate. Let us brieﬂy consider two
objections to this argument. The ﬁrst objection is based
on a worry that governments would use reparative justice
to enhance their reputation and perceptions of their
legitimacy, but that the underlying system would not
change. The second objection has to do with fairness to
taxpayers: Isn’t a city’s defending itself a way to prevent
their being overly burdened?
A Superﬁcial Reputation- and Legitimacy-Enhancing
Tool?
In her op-ed, Malcolm (2017) writes about “training,
body cameras, police-community relations and neighbor-
hood policing” as “not much more than catchy sound
bites.” Do reparations risk being viewed the same way by
lethal-force victims’ families? Indeed, there is a risk of
municipal governments embracing reparations as a means
of improving the image of police departments while, at the
same time, rejecting more fundamental changes.
Two questions are relevant here which should be
disentangled: Would reparations be politically instrumen-
talized, and would reparations preclude more fundamen-
tal changes? Let us look at the second question ﬁrst. Paul
Butler (2016, 1466–67) distinguishes between “liberal
reform,” which can have a “pacifying” effect without
fundamentally changing the American criminal justice
system, and “actual transformative work” that would
overhaul it. A reparations-based approach to police killings
could be seen as ﬁtting in with the latter. It requires
a complete turnaround in how most police departments
and cities react to the shooting of a non-liable person,
taking responsibility rather than sloughing it off in a mis-
guided act of institutional self-defense. However, one
could still argue that reparations are not sufﬁciently
transformative. To really stop police ofﬁcers from killing
non-liable persons, they may need to stop routinely
carrying guns (see Noack 2016). To really stop racialized
police killings, we may need to end white supremacy (see
Butler 2016, 1434–35 et passim). Taking this into
account, the challenge is that de-weaponizing the police
and dismantling white supremacy take time. If we wait
until there is a sea change in these areas so as to ensure that
reparations are part of a transformative, rather than merely
reform, project, this meanwhile leaves victims’ families
wronged by both unjustiﬁed lethal force and unjust civil
justice.
Accordingly, I suggest that we think of reparations for
police killings as part of a mid-range transformative
project. Reparative justice would not be needed if the
police never used deadly force, but as long as they do,
a reparative justice response is a transformation from the
existing modus operandi. Reparations for police killings
go hand in hand with what can be thought of as another
mid-range transformative project: vastly reducing the
kinds of situations where the police intervene and instead
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deploying mental health professionals, suicide prevention
specialists, drug counselors, child welfare specialists, social
workers, and so on. In a society with a more just basic
structure (to use Rawlsian language), the number of 9-1-1
calls where we need to be dispatching social workers
instead of police ofﬁcers would probably be reduced. But
the normative shift that such changes would be a marker
of would also signal a transformative movement to
a society with a more just basic structure.
Of course, there is always the risk that governments
embrace the idea of reparative justice for the wrong
reasons, instrumentalizing the concept to keep demands
for more fundamental changes at bay. This challenge,
however, is not unique to reparations and speaks to the
need for a vigilant public. It will not be lost on victims’
families, their supporters, and the media if the government
is merely paying lip service to the concept of reparations
while refusing genuine accountability.
Fair to Taxpayers?
Before addressing the objection about whether the city’s
paying reparations is fair to taxpayers, let memake a caveat.
It may be desirable from the standpoint of accountability
for an ofﬁcer who has used lethal force unreasonably to
personally contribute to the reparations payment. When
New York City settled with members of Akai Gurley’s
family, they requested a contribution from the ofﬁcer
responsible for his death. The settlement gave the ofﬁcer
four months to pay his share, $25,000, of the $4 million
amount (Fuchs 2016). It need not only be taxpayers who
pay.
This being said, one defense of the existing system of
civil litigation might be that taxpayers have the right to
the best possible defense to prevent their being overly
burdened.29 Aren’t reparations too costly? One response
has already been given. Though we do not have good
empirical data on how much cities spend defending
themselves against civil lawsuits concerning lethal force,
the costs are high enough that this can incentivize ﬁve- and
six-ﬁgure settlements. These are costs that taxpayers often
already absorb.
But there is a more principled reason why taxpayers
should pay. Though there may indeed be “bad apple”
police ofﬁcers, an understanding of any given lethal-force
death that focuses solely on individual characteristics is
implausible. Decisions about how ofﬁcers are trained,
what they carry, and so on, evolve over time and involve
many different responsible agents. Forms of racial bias,
both implicit and explicit, inﬂuencing a given ofﬁcer’s
decision to shoot are similarly shaped by social and
historical circumstances. In short, broader political, in-
stitutional, and societal factors are likely to bear on the use
of lethal force in any particular case. Over the past decade,
political philosophers have worked out compelling
accounts of why it is fair to distribute the costs of state-
sponsored injustice to citizen-taxpayers (see, e.g., Beer-
bohm 2015; Pasternak 2011; Stilz 2011;Young 2011, ch.
4). Accounts vary—some emphasize that all are responsi-
ble for injustice with a “structural” nature, some emphasize
associative obligations, and so on—but the idea of citizens
sharing responsibility for the state’s actions and decisions is
a common theme. It is these kinds of analyses that can
ground a duty for taxpayers to subsidize reparations for
police killings.
Conclusion
“The sad part about it all is money can never compensate
the loss of a son and the loss of a father of four girls.” “This
is not about money.. . . Money doesn’t bring their son
back.” “The settlement will never take away the pain that
the city caused me.”30 When plaintiffs’ attorneys and
victims’ family members talk to reporters after receiving
a civil settlement, it is typical for them to express the
noncommensurability of the money and the harm. Paying
reparations will not change this. However, they are a way
for the police department and city to apologize, to say “we
can at least do better than we have” (Vermeule 2012, 163).
In our existing system, police departments and city
ofﬁcials interpret whether a police ofﬁcer was justiﬁed in
fatally shooting a civilian by turning to legal principles.
Legal principles and moral principles do not necessarily
align, however. As I have argued, morality requires the
admission of an error when a person is wrongly killed.
This applies to police ofﬁcers and the government whom
they serve, no less than anyone else. The government
ought to serve the governed, and it can wrong its political
subjects by engaging in defensive, adversarial maneuvers
in the manner of a private party in civil litigation.
Though the alternative of reparative justice is not
a panacea, by design it is responsive to this issue.
Notes
1 The successful reparations claim of the torture victims
of the Chicago Police Department also involved
comprehensive reparative justice measures, not just
monetary redress (Taylor 2015).
2 In this article, I do not address questions of punish-
ment. The article’s goal is to think through reparations
as an alternative to civil—but not necessarily criminal—
justice. However, it is important to point out that
failures of criminal accountability can undercut the
moral meaning of a reparations payment: Ray Tensing
was not convicted for the death of Samuel DuBose, and
to the chagrin of DuBose’s family, he received a gener-
ous severance package (see note 28).
3 N.B. “Other-defense” considerations are folded in
with self-defense considerations and not given an
independent analysis in this article. I believe a focus on
self-defense is justiﬁed because (1) much of the
existing philosophical literature focuses on
11
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self-defense, and (2) empirically, most lethal force
cases involve police ofﬁcers perceiving threats to
themselves (Zimring 2017, 63). However, self- and
other-defense considerations do not cover all policing
fatalities; for example, Eric Garner died in an illegal
chokehold, and Sandra Bland died in a county jail cell.
Nonetheless, because these individuals were not liable
for their fates, the reparative justice standard that I
argue for applies to these cases.
4 By contrast, in Germany, just two ofﬁcers were killed
by civilian attackers in this entire period (Zimring
2017, 79).
5 Zimring (2017, 57) ﬁnds, in the United States, that
“the major reason police shoot so often is that guns
appear to be in the hands of civilians. Because ﬁrearms
are also the cause of death in more than 90 percent of
all fatal assaults on police, the dominant role of fear of
opponents with guns is easy to comprehend” (cf.
Butler 2017, 56).
N.B. An ofﬁcer’s ex post facto claim that he ﬁred his
weapon in self-defense is not always plausible. For
example, Walter Scott, an unarmed black man, was
fatally shot in the back by a white ofﬁcer, Michael Slager,
from 15 feet away. An onlooker’s video shows the ofﬁcer
subsequently walking over to Scott, handcufﬁng him
(without administering aid), and dropping his Taser on
the ground by Scott’s body. In his criminal trial, Slager
nevertheless testiﬁed, “I saw that Taser coming at me.. . .
I ﬁred until the threat was stopped, like I’m trained to
do” (Miller 2016, 130; see Hersher 2016).
6 See Miller 2016, ch. 4, and Fabre 2016 on self-defense
by police. For the purposes of this article, I follow
Fabre’s (2016) argument that police ofﬁcers do not
have special self-defense rights beyond those of civilian
self-defenders.
7 “Permissibility” and “justiﬁcation” are distinct con-
cepts; see Tadros 2011, 217–18. In line with recent
contributions to self-defense theory, I use the language
of “permissible” self-defense rather than “justiﬁed”
self-defense.
8 Note that in the most frequently debated version of
McMahan’s scenario, a conscientious driver loses
control of her vehicle through no fault of her own.
Whereas McMahan (2005) argues that the driver is
liable to being killed, others like Lazar (2009) and
Quong (2012) disagree.
9 See Draper’s (2009, 74–75) case, Mistake II.
10 I follow Parﬁt’s (2011, 150–64) distinction between
fact-relative, evidence-relative, and belief-relative per-
missions and wrongs.
11 Zimring (2017, 97) writes, “Attackers who brandish
knives and rush at police or who waive blunt objects as
they lurch toward an ofﬁcer never caused a death of an
ofﬁcer in six years. One wonders whether such
weapons should really be considered deadly weapons
when police in uniform are the targets. If these are not
deadly weapons, then the hundreds of killings each
year by ofﬁcers responding to the brandishing of such
weapons might not appear to be necessary to protect-
ing the lives of American police.”
12 N.B. Though ofﬁcers and civilians exhibited similar
levels of bias in terms of response time, ofﬁcers (unlike
civilians) did not show racial bias in “accurately”
deciding when to shoot and not shoot in the simula-
tion.
13 In her work on self-defense theory, Bolinger (2017)
argues that, under ideal conditions, it would be
desirable to have regulatory norms allowing well-
intentioned self-defenders to make mistakes about
a person’s liability to harm. However, empirical
evidence of pervasive racial bias casts doubt on the
justice of such norms. Accountability measures should
thus interpret mistaken acts of self-defense strictly, and
not make allowances for error.
An implication of the account I present in this article
may be the idea that criminal justice should be
concerned with whether an ofﬁcer acts reasonably,
whereas civil justice (or reparative justice) should be
concerned with a civilian’s liability. Although assessing
this notion further is beyond the scope of this article, I
am open to Bolinger’s (2017) claim that pervasive
racial bias argues for factoring liability into questions
of criminal punishment.
14 Though I focus on the black experience in this article,
the idea of a distinct racial wrong also applies to Native
people, who are often racialized as violent and are
killed at similar rates as black people by the police
(Zimring 2017, 45). SeeWoodard 2016 for the Native
Lives Matter movement.
15 See Feldman 2017, 338, who argues that Graham
allows “legal indeterminacy to produce legal immu-
nity.”
16 The concept of reparative justice is not original to this
article. For an overview of reparative justice, books
edited by Brooks (1999), Roberts (2002), and Miller
and Kumar (2007) are all excellent resources. Though
Walker (2006b) puts restorative justice and reparative
justice in a shared framework, they are more often kept
separate, with restorative justice an alternative to
traditional criminal justice procedures and reparative
justice an alternative to traditional civil justice proce-
dures. I thank an anonymous reviewer for bringing up
restorative justice.
17 The focus of this article is lethal force, not excessive
nonlethal force. If police departments routinely turned
to reparative justice when excessive force does not
result in a person’s death, I would gladly accept that
this follows from my argument, though I do not
pursue this matter further here. For more on excessive
force, see Skolnick and Fyfe 1994; Kleinig 1996, ch. 6.
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18 Quong (2012, 46, 66ff) has claimed that there is
a prima facie duty of compensation when a non-liable
victim is killed.
19 Here I do not argue explicitly that it is the city and
police department, rather than the individual police
ofﬁcer, that owe a reparative justice response. This
matter is discussed in Page (2019).
20 Balko (2013), for example, discusses the increased
militarization of US police departments in recent decades.
21 N.B. Though the present article considers reparations
to individual families, it is also possible to think that
larger-scale reparations are appropriate in the context
of a national effort to address harms at the intersection
of race and criminal injustice in the United States; see
King and Page 2018; Page and King 2019.
22 Of course, there is still the matter of interpreting
whether a person was in fact non-liable. An impartial
investigation aimed at determining liability is necessary
to determine what happened andmoreover can have the
beneﬁt of giving family members valuable information
about how their loved one died. But conducting the
investigation as speedily as possible, being transparent
about its progress, giving frequent updates, and treating
the victim’s family with respect are essential for the
reparative justice effort to be successful.
23 This is my own claim based on a data set of 501
fatalities that have spurred Black Lives Matter protests.
24 Though the attorney interviewed here is referring to
use-of-force cases, this characterization of settlement
negotiations goes beyond this context.
25 See the case of Ashley Overbey, a Baltimore police
brutality victim (Puente and Donovan 2015).
26 According to Malcolm, never once did the police
department directly tell her that her son had been
killed (Walsh 2017).
27 This is according to Hartley; the NYPD claimed it
only detained Hartley for ﬁve hours (Walsh 2017).
28 In the op-ed,Malcolm’s (2017)main concern is “the lack
of accountability for police ofﬁcers who kill or for police
departments that engage in brutality.”Though I do think
that reparations provide more accountability than civil
settlements, termination and forms of punishment may
also be needed for accountability. Indeed, even though
the civil settlement with Samuel DuBose’s family was
reparative in its spirit, it was undercut by insufﬁcient
accountability onOfﬁcer Tensing’s part: he facedmurder
charges, but two trials resulted in two deadlocked juries,
and the University of Cincinnati (UC) paid him
$344,230 on his resignation. As DuBose’s ﬁancée,
DaShonda Reid, told reporters: “UC has now reversed
any of the rights they attempted to do by Sam.His blood
is not only on Tensing’s hands [and] the justice system,
it’s now on UC’s hands” (Murphy and Curnutte 2018).
29 Settlements are paid either from a city’s general fund or
through insurance. Butler (2017, 55) suggests that this
depends on the size of the city. (Smaller cities use
insurance.)
30 The ﬁrst quote refers to Rumain Brisbon (Frank
2017). The second quote refers to Ricardo Diaz
Zeferino (Kim 2015). The third quote refers to
Ramarley Graham (Yuhas 2015).
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